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ABSTRACT
EXPLAINING PARTITION: RECONSIDERING THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY
DILEMMA IN THE CYPRUS CRISIS OF 1974
By
Michael Todd Smith
University of New Hampshire, December, 2009
In this thesis the proposed link between a security dilemma at the
domestic-level of analysis and partition following ethnic conflict is examined in
the context of the Cyprus crisis of 1974. The original framework of the argument
being examined was offered by Chaim Kaufmann and is analyzed here by
comparing and contrasting the history of Cyprus with the components of the
framework. The thesis suggests that the framework does not adequately explain
the partition in the case of Cyprus, as the history of that conflict does not reflect
the components observable in the proposed linkage between the security
dilemma and partition, nor does the situation fully reflect the traditional notion of a
security dilemma.

V

TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

iv

ABSTRACT

v

CHAPTER

I.

II.

III.

PAGE

EXPLAINING PARTITION: THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

1

Partition in Political Science

6

Efforts to Explain Partition with Theory and History

13

The Purpose of the Study

15

The Security Dilemma in Political Science

16

Linking the Security Dilemma to Partition

21

Testing the Link: Methodology

27

Study Organization

29

THE CASE OF CYPRUS

33

Historical Background

33

Examining the Dependent Variable

40

THE SECURITY DILEMMA IN CYPRUS

44

Ethnic Identities

44

Hardened Identities

47

Mobilization

49

Presence of a Security Dilemma

57

VI

IV.

TESTING THE CASE OF CYPRUS

59

V.

SUMMARIZING THE ARGUMENT

65

BIBLIOGRAPHY

71

APPENDIX

74
Security Dilemma Tables

74

VII

CHAPTER I

EXPLAINING PARTITION: THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
Since the development of the modern concept of sovereignty in the 17th
century, there have been countless examples of territories, enclosed by political
borders, that have seen their shape and size changed and reduced as a result of
human factors. Such changes often came at the end of wars, in which the losing
side was compelled to surrender "spoils" of sufficient value, so as to have made
the winner's efforts justifiable. At times, these changes came when a newly
ascendant authority determined that the lines on the map would be more
appropriately drawn in different ways. Other times still, groups of people in a
given territory simply agreed that living apart was more amenable than living
together.
There are numerous other ways in which geopolitical shifts have come
about, of course. What is significant for political scientists today is the ongoing
effort to name and classify events and phenomena that result in visible changes
of the lines drawn on the maps of the world. Among these phenomena is what
political scientists call partition. While political scientists do not yet agree if
partition "was done" or "had occurred", it is mostly agreed that partition "was" on
the island of Cyprus in 1974, and in numerous other locations around the world.
The question usually submitted is "why?"
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By the end of 1974, the island of Cyprus had been split in two: a wide,
mostly uninhabitable strip of impassable territory came to divide the northern
third of the island from the southern two-thirds. What would lie in between was
initially deemed entirely uninhabitable. This condition did not come as a result of
a powerful and destructive geophysical phenomenon, but rather the result of
political actions. This event, a type of political schism, had been seen in
numerous historical conflicts: the creation of the Irish state, the division of India
and Pakistan, and the separation of the two Koreas, to name a few. Cyprus was
just the latest, and there have been more since. However, it has become one of
the most discussed and studied examples, in no small part because of the
political environment both on and around the island at the time of the partition.
Why does partition occur? Why was the island of Cyprus partitioned, and what
lessons does that outcome hold for those studying partition generally?
Numerous theorists have proposed answers to these questions. This project
seeks to explore the proposed explanation that the intrastate security dilemma
can account for partition in cases where ethnic conflict has preceded the partition
itself.
Here partition is to be considered a continuing problem in political science,
and the security dilemma, a well-known theory concerning conflict escalation, is
treated as a possible cause for partition under certain circumstances. While this
project is focused on developing a better understanding through existing theory
of whether partition can occur as a result of the security dilemma, and is
motivated by a desire to evaluate such theory in the context of a crucial case
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study of the partition of Cyprus, we must discuss more fundamental and arguably
unresolved questions about the nature of both partition and the security dilemma
at the same time.
With regard to partition, there is little agreement among the authors that
write about partition generally with regard to the basic definition of partition, how
it arises or how it is imposed. Indeed, there is little discussion in the literature
available today that directly approaches defining partition and the reasons for its
occurrence: analysis often morphs quickly into arguments on the worth of
partition as ethnic conflict management policy for the various powers in a position
to impose it on others, or for those very few states or communities that are said
to have chosen to impose it on themselves, such as Sweden and Norway in the
early 20th century.1
With regard to the security dilemma as a potential cause of partition, there
is much discussion about the security dilemma's use in explaining political events
at various levels of analysis, and much disagreement on the matter. What was
proposed to explain events in the anarchic international community has more
recently been applied to ethnic conflicts; the appropriateness of this application is
far from settled in the fields of political science and international relations.
Additionally, the issue of identity is one that informs the security dilemma at the
domestic-level of analysis; something entirely absent from the original "dilemma."
Strong arguments have been made as to the proper level of analysis from
which to consider partition as a problem, whether at the international level of

1

Nicholas Sambanis, "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the
Theoretical Literature," World Politics 52 (2000)
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analysis or the domestic level of analysis. However, in order to test the viability
of the security dilemma as a cause of partition during or following ethnic conflict,
partition must be treated, at least nominally, as a domestic-level problem. This
will be tested directly through a previously-enunciated notion that links the
security dilemma with partition. Though proffered by various scholars, this
concept is reviewed here through the work of Chaim Kaufmann. The theory finds
that the causes of past partitions which are rooted in an ethnic conflict are the
result of acute intrastate security dilemmas. While the work of Kaufmann is
primarily prescriptive, directed at supporting the use of partition in the present
and the future to resolve ethnic conflicts, Kaufmann's own conception of partition
is based on perceptions of those partitions that have occurred in the past, and
this includes the partition of Cyprus. Essentially, this makes Kaufmann's theories
concerning the origins of partition testable. This particular understanding of
partition is based on a domestic determinants level of analysis, at which an
intrastate security dilemma naturally be pegged , but through its testing one can
observe whether or not such determinants are sufficient or even appropriate to
explain partition in the case in question.
In this paper we take the position that these perceptions of the security
dilemma and its explanatory value with regard to partition are not entirely
accurate when applied to the critical case study used here, the case of the
partition of Cyprus in the summer and autumn of 1974. For the purposes of this
study, then, the dependent variable in the testing that will be done is partition
itself, though qualified by intending for the explanation to only cover those
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partitions during or following ethnic conflict; the proposed reasons for partition,
the security dilemma, is what is to be tested directly. Cyprus will stand in as the
case in which this testing will be conducted in a thorough and critical way.
The scope of this paper's study, therefore, is to remain limited, focusing
primarily on a crucial case study that is meant to both test a preexisting theory of
partition, and to explore the dynamics of the security dilemma and partition
generally. In the rest of this chapter, the development of both partition and the
security dilemma as concepts in political science will be briefly traced, which will
be followed by the status of the concepts in the literature today. The purpose of
this is to provide perspective; the epistemological problems of these two
concepts need to be understood, so that the conclusions of this study can be
held in appropriate perspective. Also of significance is a discussion of the shift in
use of the security dilemma as an international-level phenomenon to one also
located at the domestic-determinants level. The three pieces by Chaim
Kaufmann that will provide the general structure of the argument that is to be
tested will be described, as will the background for his take on the independent
variables in cases of partition that follows ethnic conflict. The methodology for
this study will be described, as will the ways in which the testing is to be
conducted on the selected case. In Chapter 2, the dependent variable will be
measured and described, with an emphasis on the history of domestic politics in
Cyprus leading up to its partition. In Chapters 3 and 4, the independent variables
described by Kaufmann in his work will be defined for this project and then
described in the case of Cyprus. While Kaufmann refers directly to the intrastate
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security dilemma, he identifies components of such, including components
relating to identity, and each component must be matched to the Cyprus case in
order for proper testing. The argument that links the independent variables
offered by Kaufmann to partition will be evaluated. In addition to shedding more
light on the dynamics of partition, this exercise will hopefully provide direction for
future inquiry into the nature of partition and theories of partition rooted in the
domestic determinants level of analysis.
A review of the relevant literature concerning both partition and the
security dilemma is necessary to understand the complexities involved in the
subjects of this project. The two concepts are treated in this chapter as separate
and distinct; the potential causal links between them are to be evaluated in later
chapters. The development of partition as a concept is first addressed, followed
by the development of the security dilemma.
Partition in Political Science
In order to approach the question of why political partition occurs, one
must first attempt to develop a solid conception of what partition is, both
throughout history and today. Based on the great many definitions available and
widespread disagreement between scholars on the subject, this is not a
straightforward task. Partition is often thought of as simply the splitting of a
nation in two; as we shall see, its classification is not nearly so simple.
Additionally, the literature on partition is both analytical and prescriptive at times,
and oftentimes authors write from both perspectives. Kaufmann is among such
authors, and his place in the literature, informed by a strong realist background,
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comes out of the oftentimes opposing perspectives that make up the study of
partition. Kaufmann's definition of partition is just one among many, though it is
reflective of themes that have built throughout the past half-century of the study
of the concept. As the study of partition has moved from defining the concept to
asking why it arises, the discussion of this development is crucial in
understanding the nature of partition in this study (with regard to Kaufmann) and
generally. Kaufmann's prescriptive arguments are indeed based on foundational
arguments that are not settled issues in the field of political science. For a fair
evaluation of Kaufmann's take on partition, the development of the concept as an
issue in political science and its state in the literature is expressed in succinct
terms here.
The general concept of partition is not new and it can be said to predate
the notion of Westphalian sovereignty. Originally a matter of "estate law" in
feudal times,2 Brendan O'Leary points to the division of Poland in the late 18th
century as the basis for the modern, "pejorative associations of partition,"3 and
for a transition to something that was, as it related to sovereign states, outside
generally acceptable norms. Until the early 20th century, partition continued to be
seen as a nasty procedure of statecraft "for the benefit of empire, to strengthen
rule or simplify administration."4 Since then, it has been referred to as a method

2

Brendan O'Leary, "Analysing partition: definition, classification and explanation," Political
Geography 26 (2007): 888
3

Ibid., 888

4

Robert Getso, "Partition and Its Precedents," Peace Review 11:4 (1999): 591
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by which colonial powers have extricated themselves from their colonies and
have left a basis for administration along ethnic lines.
In the introduction to his book Warpaths: The Politics of Partition, Robert
K. Schaeffer describes the increased occurrence or practice of what he labels as
partition in the international community after the Second World War, and notes
that partition would essentially come and go in contemporaneous groupings, with
three observable periods in which partition occurred.5 The first period came
immediately after World War II; the second with the division of Pakistan and
Cyprus, and the third with Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and Ethiopia. These periods
were well defined by the interludes between them, during which few partitions
were observed.
Perhaps as a result of this perceived increase in the occurrence of
partition, in the last quarter of the 20th century partition began to be promoted by
some international relations theorists as the most effective (or "best") way to
resolve long-standing and bitter ethnic conflicts. John J. Mearsheimer was the
co-author of two prominent articles in the 1990's which prescribed the use of
partition in the Balkan conflicts, and preceded a number of authors that would
make arguments that ethnic conflicts often create sufficient conditions for
partition.6 On the other hand, many others came to reject the utility of partition as

5

Robert K. Schaeffer, Warpaths: The Politics of Partition. New York: Harper and Collins
(1990): 8
6

See John J. Mearsheimer and Robert A. Pape, "The Answer," The New Republic 14 June
1993; John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, "When Peace Means War," The New
Republic 18 December 1995;
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a tool of statecraft7; others still see partition as a political phenomenon akin to
any other, like war.8 Despite these various contexts in which partition has been
reportedly observed and referred to, the precise definition of what constitutes a
partition is elusive.
Partition is generally defined in the literature as akin to what O'Leary
describes as "a previously unified territorial entity... divided into two or more
parts, which may be marked with borders"9 - or, as stated above, splitting a
nation in two. Beyond this very broad definition there are a variety of more
narrow ones (and, surprisingly, a few broader ones), and this results in a
considerable variety of historical instances which may be described (or coded) as
a partition, and those that may not be. As a result, some suggest that "there is
no generalizable wisdom derived from the literature on partition"10 at all. Despite
the long history of partition as a concept, the authors included in what is referred
to by Sambanis as the "first wave"11 of partition theory scholars began writing
only in the second-half of the 20th century; indeed, we are only up to the second
wave of scholars on the subject. The first wave generally concerned itself with
7

See Radha Kumar, "The Troubled History of Partition," Foreign Affairs (1997): 22-34;
Jonathan D. Greenberg, "Divided Limbs, Phantom Limbs: Partition in the Indian Subcontinent,
Palestine, China and Korea," Journal of International Affairs 57:2 (2004): 7-27; Dan Lindley,
"Historical, Tactical, and Strategic Lessons from the Partition of Cyprus," International Studies
Perspectives 8 (2007): 224-241
8

See, for example, Brendan O'Leary, 886-908

9

Brendan O'Leary, 887

10

Dan Lindley, 224-241 See also Thomas Chapman and Philip G. Roeder, "Partition as a
Solution to Wars of Nationalism: The Importance of Institutions," American Political Science
Review 101:4 (2007): 678
11

Nicholas Sambanis, 437. Sambanis identifies a number of first wave scholars, including
Donald Horowitz, Robert A. Dahl, and Samuel P. Huntington.
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the proper definition of partition, while the second wave has been more vocal on
the question of "why" partition occurs, as well as some authors' efforts of
prescription for present-day conflicts.
Of the scholars of the "first wave", the work of Stanley Waterman, a
political geographer, and Donald L. Horowitz, whose often-cited, lengthy volume
Ethnic Groups in Conflict12 addresses widespread issues of ethnic conflict and
how to manage the related violence, seem especially relevant because of the
contrast between them. In four pages, Horowitz takes on partition as a possible
strategy for ethnic conflict management, and very simply defines partition as
"separating the antagonists,"13 in an ethnic conflict, especially where they are
territorially concentrated. On the other hand, Waterman defines partition as "a
process resulting from a situation in which two or more groups differentiated on
the basis of ethnicity, nationality or ideology find conditions more comfortable to
govern separate, more uniform areas than to live in partnership with one
another."14
One definition explains partition as a method; the other explains partition
as a phenomenon. One definition explains partition as being imposed by a third
party; the other explains partition as a condition reached by the parties in conflict
These are two continually reinforced dichotomies that exist in the writings of

12

Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press
(1985)
13

Ibid., 588-589

14

Stanley Waterman, "Partition - A Problem in Political Geography," in Peter Taylor and John
House, Political Geography: Recent Advances and Future Directions, Kent: Crook Helm Ltd.
(1984): 99
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ethnic conflict theorists and political geographers considering partition during the
first wave.
More recent, second wave scholars have not been any more consistent
with each other in their definitions, however. O'Leary, a prolific writer on the
subject of ethnic conflict more concerned with defining partition as a
phenomenon than worrying about its efficacy, emphasizes the need to
distinguish partition from secession. He therefore suggests the more specific
definition of "a fresh border cut through at least one community's national
homeland, creating at least two separate political units under different sovereigns
or authorities."15 This definition clearly describes partition as a phenomenon. He
goes on to make clear distinctions between partition and the act of secession.
Not everyone distinguishes partition and secession, however. When
defining partition, Jaroslav Tir specifically includes the motivation for partition in
his definition, with secessionist-based divisions as a type of partition. He defines
partition as "an internally motivated (i.e. secessionist) division of a country's
homeland... territory that results in the creation of at least one new independent
secessionist state."16
Most relevant to this paper, Chaim Kaufmann in turn defines partition in
the context of those imposing it.17 He states that partition is a "(separation) jointly
decided upon by the responsible powers: either agreed between the two sides
15

Brendan O'Leary, 888

16

Jaroslav Tir, "Dividing Countries to Promote Peace: Prospects for Long-Term Success of
Partitions," Journal of Peace Research, 42:5 (2005): 545
17

Though, as will be demonstrated, Kaufmann's definition does not imply that the causes of
partition rest with the powers imposing it.
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(and not under pressure of imminent military victory by one side) or imposed on
both sides by a stronger third party."18 Kaufmann, like O'Leary, goes on to
distinguish this from secession, though his definition for that phenomenon differs
from both O'Leary and Tir.
Chapman and Roeder observe that while there is little agreement over a
precise definition of partition, there has been some general consistency between
those they label as "comparativists" and those they label as "internationalrelations scholars."19 The comparativists have tended to clearly distinguish
partition from other forms of post-conflict institutional arrangements (such as de
facto separations or autonomy), whereas the international-relations scholars tend
to lump these concepts together (which Chapman and Roeder allege "conflates
important distinctions among different domestic political institutions that shape
post-settlement political processes inside states"20). In the above examples, the
political geographers (Waterman and O'Leary) would constitute the
comparativists, while Horowitz and Kaufmann are clearly among the
international-relations scholars. Chapman and Roeder don't clearly observe
consistent distinctions between partition and secession in their categorization,
however; one can observe that while the unlike pairing of Kaufmann and O'Leary
distinguish secession from partition in their respective theories, other unlike
pairings do not.

18

Chaim Kaufmann, "When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the
Twentieth Century," International Security 23:2, (1998): 125
19

Thomas Chapman and Philip G. Roeder, 678

20

Thomas Chapman and Philip G. Roeder, 678
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Why is the discussion of these details important? While Kaufmann and
Mearsheimer are firmly rooted in a traditional realist perspective concerning the
discussion surrounding partition, typology affects dramatically the study of such a
concept which has affected millions of people over the course of the past few
centuries. On this point, there is valuable insight provided by the Russian
scholar Valery Tishkov's demonstrated struggle to properly define and classify
"ethnic conflict."21 While his argument is arguably constructivist in nature, it is
instructive because of the fragmented nature of partition and how the way in
which it is studied may impact the outcomes that are reached by scholars
determining its status in the field. One might wonder, and justifiably so, how
constructivist arguments can be relevant to realist interpreters of the concept of
partition, a group Kaufmann and his predecessors easily belong to. Realist
arguments like those of Kaufmann must still depend on the consistency of the
definitions of concepts being worked with, in order to evaluate the power
relationships between two or more actors. Prescribing something that is not yet
consistently defined can conceivably lead to major issues in the study of the
subject. Aspects of this problem may be observable when studying partition.
Efforts to Explain Partition with Theory and History
The scholarly work of Mearsheimer and Kaufmann, and of those reacting
to them, has nevertheless begun to formulate some general answers to the "why"
of partition. These authors try to correlate the presence of certain types of ethnic
conflict in countries which have undergone (successful) partitions in the past.

21

Valery Tishkov, "Ethnic Conflicts in the Former USSR: The Use and Misuse of Typologies
and Data, Journal of Peace Research 36:5 (1999): 571-591
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They then go on to argue this as a basis for the use of partition in the future.
Many (including this author) take issue with the specific components of their
theories, yet the scholarship on partition has proceeded from first wave, when the
focus was largely on definition, to the second wave, where definition is
accompanied by the "why" and the "how effective?" This being said, there is little
in the literature of both the first and second wave to suggest that much has been
"settled" on the topic of partition.
For now this author hesitates to provide a further litany of partition
definitions; the disagreements as to what might constitute a precise definition will
continue. However, it is very useful to look at the practical side of partition
theory. What disputes or conflicts can be considered to have resulted in, or to
have been ended by, partition? As with answering the question "what is
partition?" it of course depends on who you ask, and the edges of the inclusive
group of "events that were partitions" vary accordingly. Those who define
partition narrowly might include states that O'Leary describes as having
undergone partition based on his "fresh cut" definition: Ireland and Hungary in
1920, India in 1947, Palestine in 1937 and 1948, and Cyprus in 1974.22 These
are commonly discussed cases in the literature; Ireland, India and Palestine are
almost uniformly considered the definitive examples of partition by those
engaging in a discussion of the various cases.
Those who define partition broadly, as Nicholas Sambanis decides to do
in his heavily quantitative study of partition from 2000, might include many, many

22

Brendan O'Leary, 889-890
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others. When Sambanis states that partition is simply "a war outcome that
involves both border adjustment and demographic changes," he includes
examples like Azerbaijan in 1996, China-Taiwan in 1947, Georgia twice in the
1990's, the former Yugoslavia multiple times, and even Cyprus in 1963 (when
there was a limited degree of ethnic "unmixing" as a result of Turkish-Cypriot
formation of enclaves in major cities and towns).23 Indeed, this definition would
permit many of the states involved in many of the conflicts of the past century to
be labeled as having undergone partition.
The Purpose of the Study
We do not aspire to resolve all of the typological difficulties that partition
presents and indeed, exposure to where partition is said to have occurred in the
past is relevant here merely to show the extent to which it is a problem in
international politics. This discussion is also intended to provide perspective
however, and to draw out some analytical utility from what has been written on
partition before. The range of political phenomena that is encompassed by the
term "partition" may be greater than or less than what is covered by those
definitions that are discussed in some quick detail here. We can see that many
nations over the past century alone have been split in two or more pieces;
generalizing about those splits and why they happen is the difficult part.
For this paper, however, it is useful to take one part of the ongoing
argument, and start looking for answers. Over the past two decades, a growing
number of neorealist theorists have begun to apply a political theory known as
the security dilemma to conflicts seen to be "intrastate" as opposed to
23

Nicholas Sambanis, 447-449
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"interstate." Among those authors is Chaim Kaufmann, who attributes partitions
in various places over the past century as having been necessitated by domesticlevel security dilemmas. Included among the cases from which Kaufmann draws
his conclusions is the partition of Cyprus in 1974. Whether his understanding of
partition and the security dilemma, and indeed a genera! understanding of these
political concepts, can be correlated with the situation in Cyprus is the primary
question to be answered here. We take Chaim Kaufmann's writings, and, based
off of his suggested typology of partition and the dynamics of the security
dilemma as he understands them, apply it to the case of Cyprus to see if such
ideas holds up for the specific case of Cyprus. As previously stated, partition in
political science, including the basic definition and classification of it, is not a
settled topic in the literature. While Kaufmann's prescriptive arguments will not
be explored here, there is a great deal which must be observed about partition
and how effectively, or not, the domestic-level application of the security dilemma
can explain the dynamics of it. In order to proceed to testing Kaufmann's ideas,
we must first understand the background of the security dilemma, and how it
came to be used to address domestic-level conflict.
The Security Dilemma in Political Science
Kaufmann's theories were chosen in lieu of many others that exist
because he contends that the basis for partition having been imposed on ethnic
communities in conflicts in the past lies in certain characteristics of those ethnic
conflicts, most notably the security dilemma. The security dilemma is a wellknown and well-studied concept that comes out of traditionally realist ways of
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looking at international relationships. Before describing the rest of Kaufmann's
work, some background on realism and the security dilemma is appropriate.
Realism is a term often used in international relations and political
science, and it generally refers to a school of thought concerning the way in
which states behave in relation to one another. The basic tenets of realism are
that states are primarily self-interested actors and will act to pursue their interests
in an anarchic international arena. This is best done by maximizing the power of
the state in relation to all of the other states, and preserving any advantages that
the state may have. Political scientists often look back to Kenneth Waltz as the
one who first clearly articulated the role of realism in international relations, and
since the publication of his Man, the State and War, many others have refined
the logic of realism with regard to problems that appear in the international
community.
The security dilemma can be seen as one of the early efforts to refine the
typically realist view of international relations. It has been traditionally viewed as
an international relations theory that can be used to understand the "ramping up"
of conflict between two states, most notably with regards to arms races. States
that exist in an anarchic situation will naturally tend to try to increase their own
security. While the concept dates back to the 1950's in separate works by John
Herz and Herbert Butterfield24 , Robert Jervis' work in a 1976 book and the article
"Cooperation under the Security Dilemma" in 1978 is often pointed to as the
foundation of security dilemma theory. According to Jervis, the security dilemma
24

Paul Roe, "The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a Tragedy?" Journal of
Peace Research 36:2 (1999): 183
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is based on the notion that "an increase in one state's security decreases the
security of others"25 and that, as a result, the others will attempt to compensate,
leading to the original state's perceived reduction in security and so on. While
Jervis himself goes on to apply his theory's logic on an individual level (police
officer and suspect in a dark alley26), the security dilemma was usually
considered to be most relevant with interstate conflicts.
However, a number of theorists since the Cold War have taken the
security dilemma logic and attempted to apply it to ethnic conflict. In his article
"The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a Tragedy'?" Paul Roe
provides a sweeping summary of the transition of the concept of security
dilemma from one focused on relations in the international community to those at
a domestic level between ethnicities in conflict. Roe points out the scholars who
have led this transition and the ways in which structures at the international level
can be approximated by domestic-level structures.
The scholars Roe discusses include Posen, Mearscheimer and (Stuart)
Kaufman, among others. Posen, for one, asserts that the security dilemma has
"considerable ability to explain and predict the probability and intensity of military
conflict among groups emerging from the wreckage of empires."27 As
summarized by Melander, Posen "applied the logic of the security dilemma to
ethnic conflict, and argued that geographically induced first-strike advantages

Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30:2 (1978): 186
Ibid., 189
Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival, 35:1 (1993): 43
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help explain the outbreak of ethnic warfare... (and that) first-strike advantages
are greater if ethnic groups in conflict live interspersed with each other."28 Yet, in
order for this to be the case, numerous domestic-level structures must be shown
to be similar to those at the international level. Roe states that the logic of the
security dilemma is said to remain constant in intrastate conflicts when
"conditions (within states) are similar to those between states in the international
system,"29 and Stuart Kaufman, as quoted in Roe, points out that while "strictly
speaking the security dilemma should not apply to contending ethnic groups
within a state... anarchy can be approximated... if ethnic groups effectively
challenge the government's legitimacy and control over its territory."30 Anarchy,
then, and the security threat of possible first-strike capability that comes with the
arrangement of groups under anarchy, need to be structures that can be
approximated within the domestic-level situation characterized by ethnic conflict.
There are other structures, however. Kaufman is also quoted in Roe as saying
that "the neorealist concept of a security dilemma cannot be mechanically
applied to ethnic conflict: anarchy and the possibility of a security threat are not
enough to create a security dilemma between communities which may have
been at peace for decades. An ethnic security dilemma requires reciprocal fears
of group extinction."31

28

Erik Melander, "The Geography of Fear: Regional Ethnic Diversity, the Security Dilemma
and Ethnic War," European Journal of International Relations 15:1 (2009): 96
29

Paul Roe, 188

30

Stuart Kaufman as quoted in Paul Roe, "The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as
a Tragedy?" Journal of Peace Research 36:2 (1999): 189
31

Stuart Kaufman as quoted in Paul Roe, 192

19

According to Roe, Stuart Kaufman and others, an additional, necessary
component of the intrastate security dilemma is the threat to the continuing
existence of identity, especially ethnic identity. For Roe, this presents what is
better termed as an "(inter-) societal security dilemma,"32 which essentially
means that the intrastate security dilemma is one between ethnicities which hold
on to distinct cultural identities, with the fear that these identities are at risk from
the strengthening of the other cultural identities. In this way, the notion of
straightforward "increases in security by means of an increase in armaments by a
state in the anarchical system of world politics leading to a security dilemma" is
replaced by a variety of ways to increase or decrease the security of identitybased groups in a system merely resembling anarchy. Roe points out that in this
system, "one society (minority group) seeking only to defend its identity within the
state may be perceived by another (majority group/state) as harbouring
secessionist goals."33
The finer points of the argument that identity is a crucial part of any
intrastate security dilemma have yet to be agreed upon. However, it is an
intriguing notion, especially when considering specific cases, such as that of
Cyprus. Roe's above quotation would, from a bird's-eye view, seem to describe
the character of some ethnic conflicts. Roe is not alone in his assertion that
identity plays a role in the intrastate security dilemma, either. This notion is, in
fact, one of the major tenets of Chaim Kaufmann's writings on how ethnic
conflicts come to an end. As we will see, Kaufmann asserts the same notion and
32
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applies traditional security dilemma logic to identity-based ethnic conflict and the
events leading up to past partitions, including in the case of Cyprus. Kaufmann
links the intrastate security dilemma definitively with partition, and this is why his
theories are crucial in the case study that will be described here.
Linking the Security Dilemma to Partition
Chaim Kaufmann is a prolific scholar on issues of ethnic conflict and their
resolution, writing from a distinctly realist perspective and often advocating
methods of intervention as internationalist policy for domestic disputes. In three
highly relevant articles one can see the basis for Kaufmann's conviction that
partition ought to be employed to resolve ethnic conflict; this conviction is based
on Kaufmann's understanding of why past partitions, and the various other
possible conclusions of ethnic conflicts, have occurred. It is this understanding
that we look at here, and then proceed to test in the case-study portion of this
paper. Kaufmann was chosen among a number of scholars which express the
general notion that intrastate security dilemmas lead to partitions in cases of
ethnic conflict; this is because of the clarity with which Kaufmann has expressed
this notion. According to Kaufmann, two ethnicities in conflict in a state must be
separated in order for the conflict to end; therefore, in lieu of the destruction of
one of the communities, partition must occur. The three most relevant articles
are summarized below, and make his reasoning clear.
Kaufmann's 1996 article, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic
Civil Wars," laid the groundwork for later articles which more directly addressed
partition, but the basic assumptions that Kaufmann lays out in the article are
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crucial for understanding his perspectives on partition. This early article of
Kaufmann's lays out the ways in which he believes ethnic wars come to an end.
According to Kaufmann, ethnic wars can be distinguished from other,
ideological conflicts due to a single factor: the "flexibility of individual loyalties."34
Inflexible identities are characteristic of ethnic conflict. Loyalties in ethnic
conflicts are easier to evaluate, says Kaufmann, as they are consistently tied to
one's ethnic identity. Kaufmann assumes that ethnic identities are "fixed by
birth,"35 though he acknowledges that others would not agree with his
characterization of ethnicity. Ethnic identities are the "hardest," and therefore
most inflexible, because of their dependence on many things tied to identity
generally, such as "language, culture, and religion... and parentage."36 A central
assumption of his is that a conflict between two or more ethnically-based
communities generally has the effect of hardening the ethnic identities of those
involved along ethnic lines, and creates a security dilemma that is heightened
severely when those communities' populations are heavily intermixed. Because
of the logic of the security dilemma, Kaufmann argues that any conflict between
ethnicities37 will not end until the security dilemma ends; Kaufmann believes this
can only occur by "physical separation of the rival groups."38 Kaufmann
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acknowledges in his early article that partition can occur without ethnic
separation, but that this merely increases conflict and is not logically based.
The second article of Kaufmann is especially relevant as it more directly
approaches the issue of partition. In his piece, "When All Else Fails: Ethnic
Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century," Kaufmann goes
further in detailing the circumstances in which partition may arise. He claims that
due to the security dilemma in ethnic wars, warring communities will always be
separated before the conflict ends.39 Because of this, partition becomes one of
just a few possible outcomes, all of which incorporate separation. It is here that
Kaufmann defines partition in his own terms,40 from the perspective of those that
impose it. This definition, however, is based on Kaufmann's notion that the
situation "on-the-ground" in an ethnic civil war compels the "responsible powers"
to impose partition. This crucial point is one which will be thoroughly examined in
the case study. Based on his definition, Kaufmann lists 10 partitions that have
occurred during the twentieth-century, all of which he says have led to the
formation of new states.41 Among them are the relatively peaceful examples
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occurring in Norway (1905), Singapore (1965) and Slovakia (1993), as well as
the more violent examples of Ireland (1921), India (1947) and Cyprus (1974).
A simple, early criticism of Kaufmann's particular definition of partition is
that it does not seem to lead to a more thorough typology than a distinction
between those partitions that are violent and those that are not violent, and
partition's distinction from secession. Kaufmann distinguishes partition from
secession by defining the latter as a "new (state) created by the unilateral action
of a rebellious ethnic group."42 Essentially, if both parties in a conflict agree to
the separation, it is partition (hence the peaceful partitions); if a separation is
imposed on two parties by an outside party, it is partition (hence the violent
partitions). However if one party successfully separates from the original, it is not
partition at all, but rather secession. This can become confusing.
His article's primary focus, though, is on the favorability of partition in
various situations; it is not a work like that of O'Leary, who is concentrated on
defining and classifying it. After briefly evaluating four partitions (Ireland, India,
Palestine and Cyprus) on the basis of their appropriateness given the
circumstances, Kaufmann concludes by offering policy recommendations to
those considering ethnic conflict management techniques.
The third of Kaufmann's works that is relevant here is his own evaluation
of the partition of Cyprus. While it will be more useful in the portion of this paper
that discusses the case study of Cyprus, there is one observation that will be
made about it here: while the article never restates his earlier definition of
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partition, its discussion of partition does not remain entirely consistent with that
earlier definition. Kaufmann states prior to discussing the 1974 partition that the
conflict in Cyprus in 1963-1964 resulted in its first partition when many TurkishCypriots formed enclaves scattered throughout the island. These enclaves were
not linked with each other, nor were they concentrated in one particular section of
the island. Indeed, there remained many mixed towns and most of the cities
continued to have neighborhoods made up of both communities. The Greek and
Turkish Cypriots (which will be defined as our ethnic communities in the case
study) certainly did not agree to this "partition," and Kaufmann even argues that
the Greek-Cypriots were very much against the formation of the enclaves - a
basis for the security dilemma which would, theoretically, develop. However, this
"partition" was not imposed by foreign powers or a third party either - in fact, if
there was a time at which foreign powers had the least to do with the island, it
was during this first post-independence island-wide conflict. In the context of
those that impose partition, the events of 1963-1964 would seem not to reflect
partition; if anything they might be seen as a form of secession under
Kaufmann's definition. The word partition is used too freely in this instance.
From the content of these articles we can clearly identify why, from
Kaufmann's perspective, partitions in the past occurred. The purpose of this
paper is to test this perspective, and as a result of the testing, challenge it.
Kaufmann's explanation for why states in ethnic civil war are partitioned explains
that "once ethnic groups are mobilized for war, the war cannot end until the

25

populations are separated into defensible, mostly homogeneous regions."43 In
his theory, "disputes between communities which see themselves as having
distinct heritages over the power relationship between the communities"44 results
in a security dilemma, which cannot be remedied by anything other than
separation due to the hardening of ethnic identities. According to Kaufmann,
"ethnic war causes ethnic unmixing"45 and while the formal partition may require
the intervention of an outside entity to enact the partition, the primary causes for
that partition lay in the security dilemma posed by the ethnic mobilization.
Therefore, the more formal hypothesis would be: If there is an intrastate security
dilemma (characterized by hardened ethnic identities and mobilization), then this
leads to partition. This is the hypothesis that is to be tested here using the critical
case study of Cyprus. The independent variable offered is that which simply
summarizes the variables which Kaufmann expressed in the three articles as
leading to partition, described most clearly in his second article. While the
"primary" independent variable is the security dilemma, discussion of this from
the perspective of Kaufmann must include the terms "hardened ethnic identities"
and "mobilization", which he utilizes to describe his theories. This being said,
these terms are not defined in any great detail in the three articles mentioned,
though this conveniently allows this author flexibility in evaluating the framework
offered by Kaufmann, and the case in question.
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Testing the Link: Methodology
In order to test Kaufmann, the use of a crucial case study will allow the
reader to understand the details of a particular partition following an ethnic
conflict and the dynamics which cannot be understood from the abstract. To that
end, we have selected the partition of Cyprus as the case study for this paper.
The selection of Cyprus is not random. The author has identified potential
inconsistencies with Kaufmann's theories and has chosen the Cyprus case upon
reading those theories; the references made with regards to Cyprus throughout
Kaufmann and others' works have brought up many potential ways in which to
examine both the problem of partition and how the security dilemma is used to
address it, and the partition of that little Mediterranean island which for many
decades has been the headache of countless ambassadors and negotiators.
Due to the selection of a single case study, however, the results of this paper are
to be viewed as limited in terms of their overall generalizability. This is a paper
that looks at partition and the appropriateness of the security dilemma as a cause
of partition, but is fundamentally about demonstrating that a certain explanation
for partition may not be appropriate in the case of Cyprus. This author believes
strongly that each individual case of partition in the past must be analyzed from a
historical perspective to see if the same lessons learned here can be applied to
those cases. This being said, here we test Kaufmann's theory on the Cyprus
situation, point out discrepancies that are observed, and determine whether the
tested theory holds up in light of available historical information.
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With regards to the partition of Cyprus, the hypothesis that we are testing
can be recast to suggest that partition resulted from a state of mobilization and
hardened ethnic identity among both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots
to the point where no political conciliation was likely to occur, and an escalation
of the conflict between them was based on the standard logic of the security
dilemma. Both the characteristics of the identity problem and the escalation
caused by security dilemma logic must be present in order for the hypothesis to
hold some value in this case. As Kaufmann's theory goes, while what literally
imposed the partition was the invasion of the Turkish military, the underlying
cause of the partition was the degree of polarization within the country between
two communities (hardened ethnic identities) and the impossibility of a change in
the situation without separation, or the complete destruction of one of the
communities (characteristic of the security dilemma). It is the details of this
situation that will be used to test the hypothesis.
We must make one additional note before continuing. The conflict that
has occurred on Cyprus in active and passive forms for the better part of 55
years is of a character which has resulted in sensitivities surrounding the way it is
described. While it is important to try to remain as neutral as possible in
description, and therefore to acknowledge these sensitivities, this author also will
attempt to make his writing as understandable as possible in relation to the
general theory being considered. Therefore, the terms "ethnic conflict" and
"intercommunal conflict" will be used interchangeably to reflect the use of the first
term by Kaufmann, and the use of the second as the tacitly agreed-upon term
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used by Cyprus scholars. This brings up a question about the distinction
between "ethnicity" and "community". For our purposes, we make a sincere
effort to refer to "Greek Cypriots" and "Turkish Cypriots" as those native to the
island of Cyprus that consider themselves to be culturally Greek or culturally
Turkish, respectively. The two groups are the communities in conflict; the
question of the ethnicity of the participants will not be answered here. Here we
also attempt to clearly distinguish between entities from the nations of Greece
and Turkey and their culturally linked counterparts on the island of Cyprus by
including the "Cypriot" identifier after a particular community. Disagreement over
the proper terms to describe the communities continues today, nearly 35 years
following the partition; this author makes no claims to resolving them.
Study Organization
The hypothesis being tested is rooted in domestic determinants as the
level of analysis from which the cause of the partition of Cyprus can be observed,
as the proposed cause is an intrastate security dilemma. To that end, the
measurement of the independent variables must be in some way focused
primarily on the domestic situation in Cyprus being the core cause of the second
Turkish invasion and the resulting partition. The measurement of the dependent
and independent variables are given in abstract and, for the dependent variable,
case-specific terms below. In many ways, the choice of Kaufmann's framework
presents considerable analytical utility, as this framework is quite loose and not
strictly defined in its original expression in his articles. This clearly presents other
potential problems, but for the purposes of this explorative study, it allows this
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writer to cover considerable ground without being restricted to the confines of
narrow definitions.
In abstract terms, the dependent variable would be "partition" as defined
by Chaim Kaufmann. This definition, as mentioned earlier and repeated here for
emphasis, is: "a (separation) jointly decided upon by the responsible powers:
either agreed between the two sides (and not under pressure of imminent military
victory by one side) or imposed on both sides by a stronger third party." This
definition is in some ways convenient as the imposition of partition by a third
party is encompassed by the definition, and does not leave the imposition of
partition to an intervening variable. Additionally, the lessons of the first chapter
and the difficulty in defining partition at all are kept in mind as well. Kaufmann's
definition is but one of many available. While most of the reviewed theorists
working with partition agree that Cyprus in 1974 was an identifiable case of
partition, not all hold the same viewpoint. However, we keep with Kaufmann's
definition for the purposes of this paper and, using that definition, define partition
in the Cyprus case.
The independent variable in abstract terms would be the "presence of an
intrastate security dilemma, characterized by the presence of mobilized ethnic
groups with hardened ethnic identities." First, ethnic groups will be measured by
commonality of culture and religion. Mobilization implies the willingness and
preparedness to use organized military or otherwise violent force against another
community. Hardened ethnic identities are defined as they are by Chaim
Kaufmann. Ethnic identities are "fixed by birth" and "are hardest, since they
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depend on language, culture, and religion, which are hard to change, as well as
parentage, which no one can change."46 The degree of polarization between the
two communities indicates how hardened ethnic identities are. Finally, the
intrastate security dilemma is evaluated in terms of the entire dynamic between
the two ethnic communities in conflict. It should be mentioned that the usage of
"intrastate" before security dilemma is intended to distinguish the security
dilemma Kaufmann describes from the sort that might exist between powers on
the systemic level. It has become common practice to use "intrastate" in
domestic cases; however, Kaufmann simply refers to a "security dilemma."
Additionally, it can be observed that the definitions of Kaufmann's variables are
somewhat vague; precise measurement is lacking in the original articles, and
therefore here we will attempt to approximate historical observation to the above
variables. As the reader will see, even at a more abstract level, many potential
issues with the variables become clear.47
To examine the Cyprus problem and the events of 1974 in the context of
Chaim Kaufmann's theories on ethnic conflict and partition, one must first
establish that the abstract independent variable in Kaufmann's theories
corresponds to the Cyprus situation sufficiently to make the comparison between
abstract theory and reality. To do this, the abstract independent variable will be
broken down into three separate components based on Kaufmann's criteria.
These components are akin to "preexisting conditions," characteristics allowing a
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security dilemma to develop in a domestic situation. Each of these components
will be evaluated in the context of the situation on Cyprus in 1974 by asking the
following questions. The questions are: 1) Is the population composed of ethnic
groups with distinct ethnic identities? 2) Are these identities "hardened", as
determined by the degree of polarization between the groups? 3) Is there
mobilization of these groups? Once these questions are answered, one must
then consider whether an intrastate security dilemma existed.
For the testing portion of this paper, a crucial case study of the situation in
Cyprus in the summer of 1974 is utilized to see if the hypothesized theory, based
on the theories of Chaim Kaufmann concerning the security dilemma and
partition, is sufficient, or if the hypothesized independent variable cannot be
linked sufficiently to the given dependent variable. As described above, the
situation in Cyprus occurred as the result of many factors; it is the suggestion of
the security dilemma and related primary influences as the root cause of the
partition that this case study endeavors to explore.
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CHAPTER II
THE CASE OF CYPRUS
Historical Background
Before entering into a discussion regarding the nature and measurement
of the dependent variable in the case, a brief overview of the situation on Cyprus
leading up to the 1974 partition is useful and instructive. Cyprus has a long
history, and there have been a multitude of influences on the population which
became known as the Cypriots. These influences have more recently been
consolidated into two primary "Cypriot" identities - the following touches just
lightly the historical ramifications of this.
While there is strong evidence of numerous Neolithic settlements having
existed on the island, Cyprus has since ancient times been inhabited by a
population that culturally and religiously self-identified as Greek. This
identification survived despite the fact that the early Cypriots were repeatedly
conquered by competing civilizations from the Classical through the medieval
periods. In the 16th century it was occupied by the Ottoman Empire, the original
source of much of the ancestry of Turkish Cypriot population. As in many other
places, the Ottomans ruled the island using the millet system, allowing self-rule
within the Greek Orthodox community, so long as taxes were promptly paid.1
The relationship between the Ottomans and the Greek population of Cyprus has
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been variously described as good to exploitative on the part of the Ottomans;
aside from a series of public executions on the island at the time of the Greek
War of Independence, there is little evidence of violence between the
communities during the occupation, especially since the Greek Cypriot
community was considerably larger than the Ottoman one, which "drifted to the
island"2 during this period.
The Ottomans retained control of the island until the United Kingdom
leased the island in the 19th century in return for providing assistance with
Turkish struggles with the Russian Empire. The British later declared it a crown
colony following the Ottoman alliance with Germany during World War I and its
subsequent downfall. British control came at a time when there was increasing
Greek nationalism among the Greek Cypriots. While the Greek Cypriots and
Turkish Cypriots had lived relatively harmoniously alongside each other as
previously mentioned (especially in contrast with other areas of the world in
which culturally Greek and culturally Turkish peoples coexisted), the growth of
Greek nationalism led to intercommunal suspicions, the teaching of Greek and
Turkish nationalist perspectives of historical tensions between the communities,
and increasing political distrust. Ultimately, nationalism led to the development of
the "enosis" movement on the island - an active push for unification with
Greece.3 This movement intensified in the years following the Second World
War, during which many Greek Cypriots volunteered for the Allies, and
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subsequently developed an expectation of some degree of independence in
return.4
The enosis movement among the Greek Cypriots existed in a relatively
civil manner until the 1950's. Archbishop Makarios III, head of the autocephalous
Cypriot Orthodox Church, had attempted to use his influence on the Greek
Cypriot population to pressure the British government for independence; in 1950
he held a plebiscite in which 96% of Greek Cypriots supposedly demanded
enosis.5 Subsequent efforts to involve Greece and the United Nations in creating
a path towards unification with Greece failed (largely due to Britain insistence on
its maintenance of sovereignty over the island). Makarios and the retired
Cypriot-born Greek Colonel (later General) George Grivas then began to use the
church and a violent rebellion (in coordination with each other) to pressure the
United Kingdom into turning the island over to the Greeks,6 and to gain the
attention of the United Nations and the world community at the same time. The
minority-Turkish Cypriots, however, were unnerved by the prospect of enosis and
rallied the Turkish government to their own cause, which was embodied by a
desire for either the status quo, or a cantonal partition.7 When the issue was
finally brought up in the United Nations and in subsequent multilateral
negotiations between Greece, Turkey and the UK, it was ultimately decided by
the "guarantor powers" that neither enosis, nor a return to Turkish rule, was
4
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acceptable. Turkey refused to allow Greek control of the island; their refusal is
often attributed to the security threat that a potentially large Greek bastion off
their southern coast would pose, as well as their concern for their brethren on the
island.
The United Kingdom granted the island independence instead, which was
grudgingly accepted by many Cypriots in both communities.8 However, in the
course of the campaign for freedom from the United Kingdom, both the Greek
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots had become highly wary of each other due to
occasional "collateral" violence in the course of the Greek Cypriot campaign
against the British, and the British habit of preferring to employ Turkish Cypriots
over the Greek Cypriots in civil servant positions (which included the police
force).
After the establishment of independence from the United Kingdom in
1960, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots struggled to coexist. The
independence itself was guaranteed by the United Kingdom, Turkey and Greece,
with assurances that one or more of them would interfere in the island's politics if
it became clear that the situation there had become unacceptably hostile to either
community, or if either community attempted unification with their "motherland"9;
this created looming pressure on the government from the beginning. In
protection of this guarantee, a few hundred Turkish and Greek troops were
mandated to be stationed on the island, and those numbers ballooned
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unsurprisingly beyond the set levels at a rapid pace.10

The Greek and Turkish

Cypriots attempted to make a unitary government function; the constitution was
instituted with the cooperation of the three guarantor powers and its creators
were cognizant of the fact that tensions were high between the two communities
on the island, as radical Greek Cypriot elements continued to demand enosis,
and small, militant Turkish Cypriot groups prepared for conflict. The constitution
provided for shared government, with generous proportions of government
positions granted to the Turkish Cypriots given their numbers (in an effort to
prevent the Turkish Cypriots from being steamrolled in administrative decisions
by the majority - roughly 80% of the population was Greek Cypriot at the time),
and shared veto power over the approval of legislation.11
However, the majority Greek Cypriots took full control of the government
of the Republic of Cyprus in 1963, when the minority Turkish Cypriots pulled out
of the government and retreated into enclave communities scattered around the
island following a protracted series of intercommunal attacks and counterattacks
that year. The fighting was seemingly prompted by the Archbishop's (now the
first Cypriot president) attempts to reorganize the constitution and the political
discord that the attempts created. Due to the quotas on employees from each
community, many positions dedicated to Turkish Cypriots were going unfilled and
government functions had come to a standstill. Turkey, in its role as a guarantor
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power, rejected the reorganization attempts even before the Cypriot Vice
President (by law a Turkish Cypriot) Fazil Kuchuk had a chance to veto them.12
Stronger and more violent underlying differences were ever-present.
Sporadic intercommunal violence persisted for a time even after UN
peacekeepers were installed on the island in 1964; the UN as an organization
was attempting to bring the two communities together under some form of
cooperative government, yet often were only able to keep opposing groups of
Cypriots apart and in separate neighborhoods in the cities using peacekeeping
troops; even this proved a challenge, however13 The Turkish government even
launched a series of aerial bombings when peacekeepers could not prevent an
attack on a particular Turkish Cypriot enclave; they were then told in stark terms
by the American President Lyndon Johnson not to do more to inflame the
situation.14 In late-1967, following the formation of a military government in
mainland Greece, the (mainland) Greek-supported, trained and staffed Cypriot
National Guard launched a series of raids on Turkish Cypriot neighborhoods and
enclaves, apparently without the will of the core leadership of the Greek Cypriot
government. The negative reaction among both the Greek Cypriot leadership
and the world community lead to the expulsion of the Greek contingent of troops
(as well as a near invasion by Turkey).15 By 1967, this contingent had reached at
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least 10,000; many were to covertly return. Obviously, this did nothing to
increase the confidence of the Turkish Cypriots.
The period following the 1967 crisis was one of relative calm, and of talks
which "focused on a search for a system of local government which would give
Turkish-Cypriots a degree of autonomy without endangering the unity of the
state."16

While the violence began to subside following the expulsion of Greek

troops and the initiation of the bi-communal talks in 1968, those talks had yet to
achieve a resolution when the partition was enacted six years later. As the talks
were ongoing, there was quiet surge in operational strength among the Greek
Cypriot extremists under the name EOKA-B, who, organized by General Grivas
(who had become disenchanted with Makarios after believing that enosis was no
longer the goal in the mind of the president) and supported by the mainland
government of Greece, turned their attention to the Greek Cypriot government of
President Makarios. There were numerous assassination attempts on the
president during this time (all of which the president "miraculously" escaped from
- even a helicopter crash - thereby cementing his nearly cult of personality
status among many Greek Cypriots).17
However, by 1974 high-ranking members of the Greek junta (including
Colonel loannidis, the purported day-to-day leader) began to plan for an outright
coup. According to Laurence Stern, significant sums of money had been coming
from Athens to support EOKA-B's plans - which were dedicated primarily to the
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toppling of President Makarios (in the name of enosis).18 While General Grivas
died shortly before the plan was executed, the Greek junta was able to keep his
extremist group together and put a man named Nikos Sampson, notorious for his
open hatred (and past murders) of the Turkish Cypriots, in place as its nominal
leader.19 On July 15th, 1974, a small number of tanks and armored vehicles
rolled from National Guard barracks to the Presidential Palace in the capital of
Nicosia, as well as to the town halls of the other major cities in Cyprus. In
Nicosia, martial law was declared, as was the death of Makarios (in fact,
Makarios walked out the back door of the Presidential Palace, across a street,
and into a taxi, which eventually brought him to the British bases for safe escort
off of the island). Sampson was then put in place as the new President of
Cyprus. He would remain in this position for a total of eight days; the coup and
his installation as president precipitated the crisis just prior to the partition of the
island.
Examining the Dependent Variable
Kaufmann's definition of partition, as previously stated, is: a "(separation)
jointly decided upon by the responsible powers: either agreed between the two
sides (and not under pressure of imminent military victory by one side) or
imposed on both sides by a stronger third party."20 In this case, it was the latter
which occurred. In order for Cyprus to constitute a partition by Kaufmann's
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definition, one must consider Turkey to be a separate entity from the Turkish
Cypriot community on Cyprus, given that it was Turkey which acted to separate
the two communities on the island (keeping in mind that the "why" is still the
outstanding question). Even given the sensitivity of applying labels to the
communities on the island and their respective cultural homelands, it is generally
held in the literature that this was the case prior to 1974, despite outstanding
arguments concerning the ethnicity of the Turkish Cypriot community. These
arguments are considered in greater detail in coming chapters.
Based on Kaufmann's definition and the history of Cyprus, the dependent
variable in this particular case, "partition of Cyprus", is a fairly straightforward
historical event in itself (indeed, it is the reasons for its occurrence that are being
framed by the security dilemma argument). On July 20th, 1974, five days after
the coup against the Makarios government, the Turkish military launched an
invasion by air and sea from the southern coast of Turkey to the northern coast
of Cyprus and established positions on the northern coast. Initially linking two
major Turkish Cypriot enclaves, the military paused when the junta-supported
regime fell (along with the junta itself, which faced major domestic and
international backlash following the removal of Makarios). Fiona Adamson
describes how Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit "appeared to believe that
(the resulting change in government in Athens following the unsuccessful coup)
would lead to a resolution of the Cyprus conflict,"21 and the leader of the Cypriot
House of Representatives, Glafkos Clerides, became interim President and
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began negotiations with the Turkish government to reach an acceptable
conclusion. The negotiations reached an impasse over the creation of separate
zones for the communities, however, and the Turkish military proceeded to take
over the northern 37% of the island by the end of the following month. Nearly all
of the Greek Cypriots north of the line set up by UN troops after the end of the
Turkish advance were expelled to the south during this time. Turkish Cypriots
both fled, and were pressured by the Turkish military to flee, north, to the point
where very few of one community were left in the areas controlled by the
opposite community. This resulted in the complete, de facto division of the
territory in which the two communities once coexisted politically (at peace and in
struggle). The division of the island has not been recognized in international law
or by any individual nation except for Turkey and, for a time, Pakistan. This
division was imposed on both communities by a stronger third-party, and
therefore, for the purposes of this paper, this fulfills the requirement of linking the
dependent variable of Kaufmann to the case of Cyprus. There have been
various proposed explanations for why the partition occurred: there are
numerous authors which have proposed theories that suggest there was an
international imperative to solve the situation as it threatened to involve two
NATO allies in a direct conflict.22 Others have pointed to the domestic policy of
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Turkey regarding the post-coup situation.

Kaufmann's theory focuses our study

on the domestic situation within Cyprus itself.
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CHAPTER III
THE SECURITY DILEMMA IN CYPRUS
The relevant aspects of Kaufmann's theory must be identified in the case
of Cyprus by examining the three components described in Chapter 1. 1
Kaufmann's characteristics which allow for the presentation of the security
dilemma logic in a domestic setting are each evaluated independently, and then
a consideration of the three together is given, followed by an analysis of any
apparent security dilemma.
Ethnic Identities
With regard to the first component, as to whether there were distinct ethnic
identities in the two communities in question, the answer is mostly
straightforward. While the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots had coexisted on the island for centuries, they continued to retain their ethnic identities,
and these existed in 1974. The Greek Cypriots spoke Greek, were Greek
Orthodox Christians, and had developed strong Hellenistic feelings and
traditions. The Turkish Cypriots spoke Turkish, were Sunni Muslims, and looked
to Turkey as their cultural homeland.
Historically the Greek Cypriots were allowed to retain independent
religious leadership while under Ottoman and British rule; this leadership was "a
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source of continuity and security during occupation"2 and allowed the Cypriots to
keep their Greek identity. The Turkish Cypriots lived by the Ottoman set of rules,
the Greek Cypriots by their own. However the Ottomans also used "confiscatory"
colonial tactics to take advantage of the Greek Cypriots, contributing to later
Greek nationalism,3 and placing the Greek Cypriots in a iower "class" than the
Turkish Cypriots. According to Joseph, as quoted in Lindley, although there
were, "four centuries of coexistence and considerable physical intermingling, the
two communities remained separate and distinct ethnic groups."4 During the
British period, the Greek Cypriots began rallying for enosis, resulting in the
Turkish Cypriot response of taksim, or the partition of the island into two
territories, to be absorbed by their respective "motherlands". At this point,
according to Wolfe, "the conflict had begun,"5 and very little (though with some
significant exceptions) cultural convergence of the two communities occurred
leading up to the events of 1974.
One potential flaw in this component being applied to the Cyprus problem
is the argument that the Greek and Turkish Cypriots might not have held on to
the "Cypriot" party of their identity at all, but rather considered themselves Greek
and Turkish nationals, and oriented themselves in this way. There is some
supporting evidence to this assertion, especially given the segregation between
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the two communities in the 1960's. Even after the establishment of an
independent Cyprus, each community had been "encouraged to establish and
maintain separate 'special relationships' with their motherlands," especially with
regards to "educational, cultural, religious, sporting and ethnic related matters."6
Schools received Greek or Turkish textbooks, and the longstanding historical
conflict between the two civilizations was routinely emphasized.
It is clear that the leaders of the Greek Cypriot government did not act in a
way that promoted a Greek national identity, however. While President Makarios
had at times referred to the notion that all Cypriots were Greek, he convincingly
shifted his priorities over the 1960s by moving away from enosis and instead
towards establishing a strong Cypriot government. As Schaeffer argues,
Makarios "did not want to subordinate his movement to Greek authority or
antagonize Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot minority."7 This was especially true
following the takeover of the Greek government by a (by most accounts) fanatical
junta in 1967. There is evidence that most Cypriots, Greek and Turkish, had
begun to value their independence along the same lines as Makarios, at least
more so than with the radical elements of Cypriot society.8 Continued reverence
for the pro-enosis zealots on the part of a small minority existed as an influence
on the island is a consideration that should not be taken lightly, however.
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The general argument concerning a lack of the "Cypriot" part of identity
altogether deserves greater exploration than this current study can provide for,
as information concerning that identity has been, in the opinion of the author,
often very partial and generally unreliable. It is generally held in the literature,
however, that the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were independent
communities, and while culturally linked to their respective mainlands, they were
for the time being independent political communities as well. For the purposes of
this study it is suggested that the Cyprus situation satisfies the first Component,
as it is clear that there were distinctions between Greek Cypriot and Turkish
Cypriot identity.
Hardened Identities
With regard to the second component, there are a variety of ways in which
the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot identities had hardened by the summer of
the partition, and the most clearly observable are the instances of ethnicallybased violence that had occurred leading up to the point at which the island was
partitioned, and the effect on each community in the aftermath of those
instances. There was sporadic intercommunal fighting in the British period,
followed by widespread fighting at the collapse of the constitution in 1963, and
reckless (Greek-supported and controlled) Cypriot National Guard action in 196768 that sparked another round of fighting. Following the conflict in 1963, a United
Nations Peace-Keeping Force (UNFICYP) was sent to enforce a separation of
two neighborhoods in the capital and to prevent the outbreak of fighting between
the two communities around the island; additionally, the Turkish military
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threatened to invade in 1967 on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots; both instances
contributed to a hardening of identity because of partial physical and total
psychological separation based on ethnicity and a threat to one ethnicity by a
force related to the other.9
Chaim Kaufmann, in his own evaluation of the partition of Cyprus,
observes modes occurring over the few decades preceding the partition by which
the two communities had hardened their identities. These well-documented
examples include: a) the previously mentioned separate educational systems
from the times of British rule through the time of independence, where each
"represented its own people as consistently heroic and the other as consistently
barbaric;"10 and b) the persistent existence of a pro-enosis Greek Cypriot militia
after the independence of the country in 1960, which the Greek Cypriot
government itself was having trouble controlling. Known as EOKA-B (the second
version of EOKA, the Greek Cypriot rebel group during the 1950's), it would be
partially responsible for the coup that took place just before partition.11
In addition to Kaufmann's observations, there are numerous other
characteristic examples that can be pointed to. Souter cites the constitution of
the independent Cyprus, which, in granting "exceptional minority rights" to the
Turkish Cypriots, had "frustrated" the Greek Cypriots still pining for enosis, and
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precipitated some of the violence that has been described already.12 Laurence
Stern begins his piece on Cyprus with a detailed description of the funeral of
General George Grivas, the leader of EOKA and EOKA-B, and describes how
"some 100,000 Greek Cypriots in all" came in person to honor a man known for
his "fanatical...pursuit of the age-old Hellenic dream of enosis" and harsh attitude
towards the Turkish Cypriots - and this just months before the partition.13 All of
these points taken together suggest that there was considerable polarization
between the two communities at various times during the period being
considered.
Mobilization
With regard to the third component, or the mobilization of each side, the
answer is not as immediately clear that the situation on Cyprus meets the
abstract definition, and for a number of good reasons. For the sake of argument
and in the interest of testing the basic, underlying hypothesis, this author will
suggest that this component is fulfilled as well; however, serious reservations
exist and will be expressed here. The main question lies in the following: who
was mobilized, and more importantly, what were they mobilized for? Mobilization
in this case is strictly related to traditional military/strategic capability; Kaufmann
does not treat mobilization as being consistent of anything other than the
traditional notion of an ability and willingness to fight, unlike some authors that
suggest mobilization can take the form of actively appealing to and strengthening
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identity. For Kaufmann the significance of identity, while clearly present based
on the previous two components, is distinct from traditional mobilization.
Based on earlier fighting, which was often fierce, there is a general
assumption that there was a willingness on both sides to fight if necessary.
Additionally, by the mid-1970's the Turkish Cypriots stiii mostly confined
themselves to defensible enclaves or exclusive neighborhoods for the perceived
need for protection and self-governance, which presented what was arguably
strategic threats to the Greek Cypriots; the interspersed nature of the Turkish
Cypriot communities within the overwhelming majority of the land inhabited by
the Greek Cypriots recalls Posen's arguments about interspersed populations
and violence. Additionally according to Kaufmann, while "in theory the enclaves
were under tight blockade... in practice weapons and... fighters were smuggled
into many of them."14 The Greek Cypriots, in control of the internationally
recognized government, with the ability to buy weapons from foreign
governments for its Cypriot National Guard (composed of as many Greek
national officers as it was of Cypriot officers) had an established force to use
against the Turkish Cypriots. The presence of a Greek-supported, pro-enosis
extremist force on the island also constitutes the mobilization of some of the
Greek Cypriots.
However, even at first glance the assumption of mobilized Greek and
Turkish Cypriot forces with the specific (immediate) intent to harm each other
after 1968 is suspect. Between 1968 and 1974, there was a period of "relative
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calm"15 in which the two sides "conducted direct negotiations,"16 which were,
according to Souter, "frequently constructive."17 During this time there were very
few deaths, "perhaps several tens"18 at the most, according to Kaufmann (it
should be noted that this estimate is the highest found by this author), related to
the intercommunal conflict directly. Glafkos Clerides, the chief Greek Cypriot
negotiator, and future Greek Cypriot president during the post-coup period of
stabilization, reportedly believed that "the talks might have been proven
productive if external powers had not intervened."19 This may seem to suggest
that mobilization, clearly evident in late-1967 at which time there had been
skirmishes silenced only by firm Turkish threats of invasion, had decreased.
Additionally, what might further dampen the analysis that the Greek
Cypriots were mobilized to the point of a willingness to act was Greek Cypriot
strategic concern that exceeded the bounds of the domestic situation. Even
Grivas, as fanatical as he is said to have been, knew that if the Greek Cypriots
(or Greeks in general) were to push too far, the Turkish Cypriots might be aided
by the Turkish government. Whether this was because of Turkish concern for
the Turkish Cypriots, or simply Turkey's desire for Cyprus not to become a
strategic threat is beside the point. The Greek Cypriot irregulars, led by the
15
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hundreds of Greek officers and thousands of Greek troops that had been
smuggled to the island after 1963, had learned this the hard way in 1967 after
attacking the town of Kophinou, which led to a near-Turkish invasion, Turkish
airstrikes and the expulsion of Grivas and most of the mainland Greek troops
from the island.""
This is in no way to suggest that intercommunal animosity had simply
disappeared once the Greek and Greek Cypriot extremists lost their foothold in
1967-68. There were clearly elements of Greek Cypriot society which continued
to despise the presence of the Turkish Cypriots and would have attempted to
reduce that presence if at all possible. However, a combination of a shift in
strategic focus and the linking of mainland Turkish interests with the situation on
the island made the realization of the more genocidal intentions of extremist
Greek Cypriots impossible. The Greek Cypriot irregulars' consideration of ends
(making Cyprus a "Greek" island) versus means (their military might) is a
domestic determination of relative strength, yet directed not towards the primary
domestic opponent, but an external element.
Despite its close ethnic and cultural ties to the Turkish Cypriot community,
the Turkish government until 1974 was distinct from any government on Cyprus.
As suggested by Borowiec and others, Turkey has been since the 1950's more
concerned with preventing Greece from obtaining Cyprus as a potential forward
base a mere 40-odd miles off its southern coast; the fact that protecting the
Turkish Cypriots was popular in Turkey made their interest in the island more
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resolute.

It remains unclear what their role in the island's governance has been

since then, but this is also beside the point.
The Greek Cypriot irregulars by the late-1960's were certainly armed and
dangerous, but following 1967-68, primarily used their resources and influence
against the interests of President Makarios, who by this time was seen by the
rightist groups as the primary impediment to their ultimate goal, enosis.22 This
perspective and the rightists' continued motivation following what can only be
described as a major defeat at Kophinou, also was likely a product of another
external element. The Greek government fell to its military leaders in 1967, and
the junta established in its place was stridently anti-communist, anti-Turk, and
anti-Makarios. According to Loizos, "the Greek dictators had no love for
President Makarios since he was democratically elected and popular, and
seemed tolerant towards communists."23
The 1960 agreement that had allowed the Cypriots their independence
from Great Britain had also established a small presence of troops from Greece
and Turkey; the officers from Greece were primarily responsible for training the
Cypriot National Guard. Loizos describes how "these officers did their best to
indoctrinate the young Cypriots with the junta's ideas, and kept a list of any
conservatives who were particularly hostile to the Makarios government."24 By
the early 1970's, these officers had "started clandestinely to distribute weapons,
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uniforms, and remuneration to those they enrolled in a new underground
movement formed in 1972, which became known as EOKA B."25 The purpose of
this organization and its activities was to undermine Makarios, weed out the
'false' Greeks26, and enact the union of Cyprus with Greece as soon as possible.
The presence of the Greek irregulars and their influence after 1968 must
be put into some context. First, in the 1968 Cypriot presidential election, the
opposition leader Takis Evdokas, someone who openly advocated for enosis,
received 2% of the vote; Makarios won the other 98%.27 Makarios was
supported by both leftist parties on Cyprus, including the Communist party AKEL;
moderates also supported him precisely because of his opponent's continued
active support for enosis. Second, following the failure of EOKA B to secure its
goals in 1974, numerous Cypriot individuals were accused and/or convicted of
subversion by the Cypriot government, due to their participation in EOKA B. The
total number of both accused and convicted members was 827.28 By
comparison, mainland Greek troops on the island, when at their legal (and
lowest) levels, numbered 950.29 These figures are intended to provide some
idea of the relative influence that enosis-driven Cypriot forces on the island had
in relation to their numbers (Tishkov's lessons about numbers in conflict aside).
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How many members of a given ethnicity does it take for action to constitute an
entire ethnic group's intent in an ethnic conflict? Especially when those taking
the action were "in power" for less than a week? These are questions for a
broader study of the subject.
Markides summarizes the development of EOKA B and its activities in the
context of the ethnic struggle by saying that, during the period between 1967 and
the partition, the "Turkish Cypriots remained spectators to the intra-Greek Cypriot
rivalry."30 This is significant when considering this component as necessary for
testing the variables in this case overall. He goes on to list several occasions on
which there was actually Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot cooperation,
including a celebration of football (one of the most treasured past times on the
island), Archbishop Makarios tour of and promise of aid to a tornado-devastated
Turkish Cypriot enclave, a polite meeting between Makarios and the former
Cypriot Vice President Fazil Kucuk, and even the willingness of Turkish Cypriot
hardliner Rauf Denktash to attend a meeting of the Greek Cypriot-dominated
Cyprus Sociological Association without bodyguards.31 These might appear to
some to be small gestures, yet the reader should recall that Cyprus is a small
place; leadership is often embodied by just a few individuals.
Even still, in the context of EOKA B's insurgency, intercommunal relations
were unlikely to have significantly improved following the generally poor
conditions of relations post-1968. Poor relations and actively hostile ones are
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two separate things, however. Some authors, including Necatigil, make
arguments claiming there was a sufficient level of mobilization among the Greek
Cypriots in the month-long period between the initial Turkish invasion of the
island and the actual partition which would have been sufficient cause for the
partition; these arguments say, in effect, that the Greek Cypriots became
mobilized to the point of carrying out murders in Turkish Cypriot communities
during the chaotic period following both invasions, in reaction to the loss of any
central leadership.32 While Necatigil points to a handful of newspaper articles,
most of the support for his argument comes from a pair of Turkish sources, one
written by the Turkish Cypriot hardline leader Rauf Denktash. Paul Sant Cassia,
who researched Cypriot deaths on the island during this period reports that "with
a few notorious exceptions that affected the Turkish Cypriots, most losses and
disappearances were Greek Cypriots."33 He also blames most of the deaths on
the extremist, Greek-supported Greek Cypriots and the remainder on the
invading Turkish army, and not the Turkish Cypriots. This is all besides the point
when looking at the argument that an intrastate security dilemma caused the
partition as well; once the Turkish invasion occurred, the dynamic clearly
changed.
All of this taken together undermines to some degree the notion, often
casually expressed in literature in which Cyprus is referred to, that Greek
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were at each others' throats leading up to the
32
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Turkish invasion. The period between invasion and partition shows more of a
potential for having clear mobilization of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish
Cypriots, but it is not clear that the Turkish Cypriots were at all mobilized relative
to other forces on the island; the evidence for widespread popular mobilization of
Greek Cypriots against Turkish Cypriots, beyond the rhetoric, is fairly thin prior to
the Turkish invasion. Finally, there is the notion that the initial Turkish invasion
changed the dynamic of the security dilemma to the point where an intrastate
security dilemma could not account for the losses on both sides, because it no
longer existed. Therefore, this could lead one to wonder if the situation on Cyprus
matches the criteria for Kaufmann's independent variable.
Presence of a Security Dilemma
In terms of a security dilemma, there is no clear demonstration of the
traditional notion of increases in security on both sides that is directly related to
the domestic increase in security on the other side, at least not purely so. This is
because the Greek Cypriot increases in security, while conceivably resulting in
Turkish Cypriot increases, were the result of Greek-on-Greek conflict or concerns
over a possible Turkish invasion. Remember, Kaufmann treats the identity
components and the mobilization components separately. While there is clear
evidence that identities were hardened and the opportunities to bolster those
identities were taken at every turn, it has not been demonstrated that identitybased mobilization was relevant with regards to Kaufmann's notions of
mobilization generally.
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We could stop here and say that the Cyprus case does not fully embody
the intrastate security dilemma as described by Kaufmann; however, Kaufmann
believes that Cyprus is indeed a qualifying case, and because the third
component can be argued in either direction, we proceed to evaluate the overall
argument on the assumption that there is a sufficient ievel of similarity between
the independent variable generally and the Cyprus case. We remain cognizant,
however, of the potential logical weaknesses in comparing the two, and will
return to this argument in the conclusion of this paper.
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CHAPTER IV

TESTING THE CASE OF CYPRUS
To evaluate the argument, we need to ask whether Kaufmann's
independent variable leads to the dependent variable in this case. In other
words, did the presence of an intrastate security dilemma characterized by
hardened ethnic identities and mobilization on Cyprus lead to, or cause, the
partition of the country. To begin, we look at the ways in which the independent
variable might have caused the dependent variable, given what we know about
both variables. Then this is weighed against the totality of information about the
event itself, to determine if the independent variable is indeed necessary and
sufficient to explain the dependent variable, only necessary, or neither.
The ways in which the security dilemma of Cyprus might have caused the
partition of the country have, of course, been partially discussed above. The
ingrained nature of ethnic identities based on nationalist education, a history of
violence and distrust, the constant presence of (albeit small) ethnic militias, and
the partial physical separation of the two communities after the 1963 withdrawal
of the Turkish Cypriots into enclaves, contribute to the notion that the
communities were "ready" for partition by Kaufmann's; as Kaufmann describes in
his theories concerning ethnic separation, once these ethnic identities have
formed and there is a willingness to fight on the part of those in each community,
then the only possible outcome is the complete physical separation of both
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groups in partition, or the complete annihilation of one group by the other. In
Cyprus, the former occurred before the latter could, or so the theory goes.
Yet, in addition to the previously mentioned concern about the situation in
Cyprus constituting a security dilemma, a number of questions must immediately
be raised about the theory's application to the Cyprus case. The first asks why
the Cyprus conflict did not result in the complete destruction of one side or the
other (as opposed to partition) if there are two possible outcomes of the type of
ethnic division and mobilization described by Kaufmann in his theory. According
to Kaufmann, "Cyprus may have been lucky not to have experienced more
rounds of war than it did,"1 and many of the reasons why genocide did not occur
lay in the determination by each side that the other could threaten their own
existence if they provoked a conflict. For the Greek Cypriots, however, the
determination was based on fear not of the Turkish Cypriots, but of Turkey itself.
Turkey was a mere 40 miles from the northern shore of Cyprus; the Turkish
Cypriot enclaves were, according to Kaufmann, "militarily strong enough to be
useful to invading Turkish forces,"2 yet too weak to present any true threat to
Greek Cypriot offensive capability on their own. The Greek Cypriot irregulars, led
by General Grivas, had made the mistake of attacking an enclave in force in late1967, as previously mentioned; Turkey was barely restrained from launching an
all-out invasion at that point.
While Turkey's involvement technically lies outside of the realm of
"domestic determinants", the strategic logic of the Greek Cypriots (irregulars or
1
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otherwise) to not risk a full scale attack on the Turkish Cypriots was determined
in the context of the domestic problem. If neither side was to destroy the other,
then this brings us back to partition and our second question. Why, or perhaps
more appropriately, how did partition occur as a result of the security dilemma
given the logic concerning the relative strength of both sides? If there existed
ethnic polarization, hardened ethnic identities, the potential willingness and
capability to use force against the other community, yet the knowledge that the
same existed on the other side, then why does partition occur as opposed to a
stasis of the situation? A catalyst of some sort which prompted a change in the
domestic situation must have conceivably been present; yet the clear catalyst of
a Greek-sponsored coup in the July preceding the partition falls outside of the
logic of the security dilemma and the realm of domestic determinants. It
becomes clear that the theory, based as it is on domestic determinants and the
dynamics of ethnic politics, is not sufficient to explain the dependent variable in
this case, though it is also clear that it remains a potential component of the
reason why partition occurred.
At the domestic determinants level, a significant preexisting condition to
the partition was the degree to which EOKA B and its Greek co-conspirators had
fragmented the authority of the Greek Cypriot government on Cyprus. There is a
much more clearly identifiable, active security situation (if not a true security
dilemma) between Greek Cypriot government forces and EOKA B forces than
there was an ever-escalating, identity-based security dilemma between the
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots during this time period. Even with this
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security situation, much of its outcome was determined by the actions of a
foreign power, Greece. This fight in Cyprus was, after all, a fight between those
wishing to unite the island with Greece, and those who had come to see the
immediate perils of doing so. The strategic dilemma a purely Greek takeover of
Cyprus might present to Turkey is easy to imagine, then and now. The reievance
of this to Kaufmann's theory, however, is slight, as his security dilemma attempts
to explain outcomes like partition during ethnic conflict. There is no way to
construe the dispute between different factions of the Greek Cypriots in the
1970's as a security dilemma along the lines of the identity-based dilemma that
Kaufmann describes, of course.
Again, none of this is to negate the intercommunal problems; they were
real and continue to exist today. It would be unwise to question the major role
that the intercommunal conflict had in the eventual partition of the island; the
conflict certainly invited the international attention that the island would receive,
for better or worse. The question is whether the security dilemma Kaufmann and
others sees existed on the island in a way which led to the partition, and given
what has been described, it seems unlikely that the security dilemma was either
the primary factor or a sufficient condition. Therefore, while the intercommunal
conflict might have "set the stage" for the partition, it was not sufficient to make
the show go on. At the time of the partition, there were more palpable issues
which may have led to the partition.
Throughout the course of researching the case, it has become obvious
that there existed considerable internal and external pressures on the situation in
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Cyprus. Some were invited by the governments involved, some not, but the
Cyprus problem was not limited to domestic, ethnic conflict alone. This does not
mean, on the other hand, that international level forces that were clearly present
on the island can be said to be both necessary and sufficient to have caused the
partition of Cyprus either; based upon the iogic and case-specific details of
testing Kaufmann, it appears as though the best explanation for the partition of
Cyprus will likely take into account both domestic determinants and international
level forces, and such a combination is not accounted for by intrastate security
dilemma theory.
Over the course of the years leading up to the partition of the island the
heavy involvement by foreign powers in the affairs on the island often went
beyond the control of those elected leaders on the island, whether in the
Republic of Cyprus government (Greek Cypriots) or in the self-administered
areas under Turkish-Cypriot control. This involvement blurred the lines between
a domestic and international conflict and undermines the purity of domestic-level
explanations that try to approach the ethnic conflict and its clear role in the
eventual bisected condition of the island. However, there is abundant evidence
that foreign powers had a direct hand in promoting, prompting and enacting the
complete physical separation of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots,
contrary to the will of the overwhelming majority of Cypriots. Indeed, while
partition had been floated as an idea among the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot
leadership since the time of the British ownership of the island, there is no
evidence that this author has found that suggests that an arbitrary division of the
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island into two, and the resulting massive population transfers, were preferred by
either community. Foreign powers may have been allowed to have the influence
that they did because of the domestic situation on Cyprus. However, the degree
and nature of that influence throws into doubt the notion that an intrastate
security dilemma or even any active security situation between rival factions
(Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot conflict or Government/EOKA B conflict) can
sufficiently account for the partition alone, or even to a sufficient degree.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARIZING THE ARGUMENT
In reviewing everything that has been said thus far, it is clear that much of
the ethnic dynamic described by Kaufmann's theories was real; what is less clear
is that the specific domestic political situation he points to as the root cause of
partition following ethnic conflict, the intrastate security dilemma, can be
attributed to the partition that would occur in the case in Cyprus. Cyprus was
torn in two by many different things. There was the intercommunal fighting that
came with its historical experience and reinitiated largely by the particular
character of its independence; there was also intense fighting between the
various factions of Greek Cypriots, each having a different vision of the future for
the island mapped out in their collective minds. When one ethnic group, the
Turkish Cypriots, felt compelled to retreat into defensible enclaves in reaction to
early troubles, and in anticipation of trouble to come, there existed a persistent
source of tension between it and the other ethnic group which believed the entire
island to be their home. The fact that both groups had long lived in intermixed
areas and continued to be spread across the island reinforced the distrust; the
fact that each community proceeded to try and isolate themselves from contact
with the other only goes to demonstrate how that distrust was deepened over
time.
However, once the two communities had developed entrenched positions,
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we see that even though there was a continued distrust of each other, there was
a relative stasis for seven years in which extremist militias refocused their
attentions on their own leaders, and intercommunal violence waned in the
presence of a stable deterrent for both sides. This seven year period is crucial;
while it cannot be said that the two communities functioned as a nation, the
urgency of the intercommunal conflict had decreased to the point where there
were signs of reconciliation - impossible according to Kaufmann. Additionally,
the presence of militias targeting the leaders of their own community, while
having a potentially negative effect on the security of the opposing identity, also
undermined the identity of that community as well - this works against the logic
of the security dilemma.
It wasn't until a catalyzing event occurred that both communities were
brought back into the fray, and by then the outcome was beyond the Cypriots'
control. As we've seen, this wasn't a Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot catalyst,
but rather a primarily Greek catalyst, then swiftly overtaken by the inevitable
Turkish response. The catalyst wasn't incidental, either. Since the birth of
independent Cyprus, both Greece and Turkey had been charged with taking care
of the island's sovereignty. Greece supplied large numbers of troops to the
island to protect its interests, and the Turkish threatened to invade whenever the
Greek Cypriots pushed too far. This all suggests that external forces had
continued to affect Cypriot politics during its independence, that this would
necessarily interrupt the logic of an intrastate security dilemma and its effect on
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the island's status, and that the island's citizens were never truly left to their own
devices.
In light of the effect of these external forces on the logic of the security
dilemma and the proposed link between the dilemma and partition, it is
concluded here that the general theory concerning an intrastate security dilemma
cannot sufficiently explain partition in the Cyprus case. The ideas that Kaufmann
present are instructive in pulling out the nature of the domestic situation in
Cyprus leading up to the partition, and it is argued that they also, in part, offer a
necessary condition for the partitions occurrence. The partition is unlikely to
have been effected as it was if both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriots identified
themselves as simply Cypriots, and aligned politically across communal lines.
The experience of the United Kingdom in Cyprus in the 1950's demonstrates how
even people from a dry little island in the Mediterranean can frustrate greater
powers. Yet, based on the available theories and the reviewed evidence, it must
be a combination of both the internal security situation and the external forces
that are needed to properly explain why Cyprus was partitioned.
The choice to test Chaim Kaufmann's theories on ethnic separation and
partition at the domestic determinants level was made because these theories
have been used in the past to justify future partition. A full understanding of past
partitions, therefore, is important. The Cyprus case study was chosen in an
attempt to demonstrate that past partitions, and even only those coming out of
ethnic conflicts, do not necessarily all fit the same mold. While on the island of
Cyprus there were continuously heightened suspicions, sporadic skirmishes and
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occasional island-wide confrontations between two distinct ethnic groups, a
variety of other influences on that situation led to the partition. The ethnic conflict
may have contributed to that partition, but is not alone sufficient to explain it.
Looking beyond the case of Cyprus and to the subjects of both partition
and the security dilemma generally, there are a number of applicable lessons
that this study can begin to contribute. What does this study mean practically for
partition theory? It is simply a statement that suggests the notion that an
intrastate security dilemma leads to partition in cases of ethnic conflict cannot be
universally held to be true for past partitions that followed ethnic conflict.
Because past cases of partition, including the case of Cyprus, are used to
recommend the future use of partition, the study is also a tacit recommendation
that perhaps greater, more accurate classification of past partitions would be
appropriate. Kaufmann's definition of partition is loose enough to encompass
many historical geopolitical divisions, the Cyprus case included. This study is not
able to shed additional light on the definitional problems of partition because of
the strict adherence to the definition offered by Kaufmann; however, a historical
look at a specific instance of geopolitical division can hopefully contribute to the
mass of knowledge that is used to resolve epistemological issues. Kaufmann's
particular definition of partition described a historical situation like Cyprus
accurately, yet his own explanation for that phenomenon could not account for a
case which met his definition of partition.
With regard to the intrastate security dilemma, this study raises questions
concerning how to accommodate the "blurring of the lines" between domestic
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and international influences on intrastate situations when there is discussion of
the security dilemma using its original logic. The differences between the
security dilemma logic in its traditional form and the security dilemma that is
based on identity as a component of security could not be fully addressed in this
study because of the way in which Kaufmann's argument was structured. While
identity is, in theory, a significant component of the intrastate security dilemma, to
what degree can it be accountable for geopolitical changes like partition in
practice? This study could not reveal more insight into this issue, as the case of
Cyprus, in this author's opinion, does not reveal identity, or a security dilemma
based on "identity as security," to be a sufficient cause for the partition of Cyprus.
Going forward, it may be useful to take a look at additional cases using the
same framework and to see if the same issues appear. Was the same dynamic
present in the case of the partition of India, for example, or in the breakup of
Yugoslavia? The domestic use of the security dilemma was alluded to by
Mearsheimer in the case of the latter at the time of its collapse, yet a structured
look at the breakup of Yugoslavia from the perspective of Kaufmann's theory
would present a useful counterpart to the analysis concerning Cyprus that was
presented here.
For the Cyprus case itself, this study is an attempt to clarify the often
casually expressed relationship between the conflict among the Greek Cypriots
and Turkish Cypriots, and the partition of 1974. It is not a denial that such a
conflict existed - and indeed was a fierce one that continues to this day.
However, it is an affirmation that the ethnic conflict and the partition can be seen
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as distinct components of the history of Cyprus, each characterized by different
political dynamics which have yet to be fully understood. I conclude that a
thorough review of the history of Cyprus cannot demonstrate the security
dilemma to be the reason behind the partition.
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APPENDIX

SECURITY DILEMMA TABLES

Table 1. Three Characteristic Components of the Security Dilemma
(according to Kaufmann)
Component 1
Component 2
Component 3
Distinct Ethnic Identities
Mobilization
Hardened Identities
Need for at least two
Of the two or more
At least two of the groups
groups in a given territory groups in a given territory
which hold on to
with distinct identities, at
to claim cultural and
identities which are
religious identity distinct
least two must hold
hardened must be
from one another
consistently to norms of
actively mobilized in the
culture and religion, and
preparation for conflict
these must be seen in
between members of
contrast to other
their group and another
identities by the group
of a differing identity

Table 2. Three Components of the Security Dilemma as Represented in Case of
Cyprus
Component 1
Component 2
Component 3
Distinct Ethnic Identities
Hardened Identities
Mobilization
Two distinct ethnic
Patterns of education and
While there was militia
identities, one that
separation of the two
activity in both
considered itself
communities during times
communities, no
culturally Greek and
of colonization lead to an
evidence of widespread
adhering to the Greek
understanding in each
mobilization with the
Orthodox religion, the
community of the other
intent to destroy the other
other culturally Turkish
as suspicious and
community leading up to
and adhering to the
potentially harmful
the 1974 crisis.
Sunni Islam religion
Component Fulfilled:
Component Fulfilled:
Component Fulfilled:
YES
YES
UNCLEAR
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